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Collateral damage?
Editor’s introduction
Inevitably, it is the health implications of the 
Covid-19 pandemic which command most 
attention followed by the macro economic 
effects. As countries wrestle with the sec-
ond wave of the pandemic, attention rightly 
focusses on daily infection rates, hospitali-
sations and, sadly deaths. Such discussion 
has recently been powerfully augmented by 
an understandably obsessive interest in the 
progress towards mass vaccination, a process 
that is about to start.  
Rightly, macro-economic issues have 
been the subject of much discussion also 
amongst politicians, the media and the public. 
Predominant, has been the question of how to 
simultaneously protect the public, particularly 
the vulnerable public, against infection and 
prevent the spread of the disease, while also 
maintaining some semblance of economic nor-
mality and some control over public finances. 
This remains perhaps the most intractable 
dilemma of the pandemic so far. At the time 
of writing, it seems unlikely that this dilemma 
will be resolved to anyone’s satisfaction until 
the widespread use of vaccinations reduces 
the underlying virulence of the disease. 
What receives less attention, are the less 
obvious economic and financial effects of the 
crisis, which may have impacts that are lasting 
and as yet not fully understood. All over the 
world, mortgage lenders have been encour-
aged by governments to exercise forbearance 
to distressed borrowers, in the interests of 
preventing mass defaults. The aims are to 
avoid a further drop in public morale and avoid 
additional economic and financial dislocation. 
The response to forbearance measures has 
generally be favourable, at least in public. 
However, the longer-term implications are 
uncertain. If lenders had simply kept the capi-
tal implications of forbearance on their books 
and absorbed loss of mortgage interest, the 
results in terms of financial stability and future 
lending appetite would have been serious 
indeed. However, regulators, central banks 
and, ultimately, governments have brought 
in various measures to mitigate the impacts 
and shore up as far as possible, the capac-
ity to lend at levels that do not precipitate 
an immediate downturn in housing markets 
round the globe. So far, the signs are that 
such actions have proved successful in the 
case of housing markets which have proved 
more resilient than many feared. But what of 
the long term? Will these governments and 
regulators manage to extricate themselves 
from support for the banking system and 
indirect support for housing finance markets 
in ways that will not cause a banking crisis or 
housing market crises further down the track 
against an economic backdrop that promises 
to be challenging for some considerable years 
ahead. Experience suggests that it is far easier 
for governments to involve themselves in sup-
porting markets that are seen as strategic than 
to withdraw such support. Housing markets 
in particular are politically sensitive.
As the prospect of mass vaccination offers the 
possibility of a relaxation in the measures that 
have impacted so drastically on economic per-
formance, it will be time to start considering 
how the relationship between governments, 
regulators and lenders should evolve in a new 
post-Covid environment and whether the pan-
demic has precipitated changes that will be 
more than temporary.
This issue of the journal has a series of fasci-
nating articles that range across countries and 
focus on some key issues including inequali-
ties in wealth and income, development issues 
in the third world and, of course, the impact 
of the pandemic. 
Our first main article The social and economic 
consequences of housing wealth inequalities 
by Adriana Mihaela Soaita, Duncan Maclennan 
and Kenneth Gibb, focusses on the impact 
of homeownership on wealth inequalities, 
drawing on data from over 30 countries. 
The article points to increasing inequalities 
between homeowners, landlords and ten-
ants, particularly when asset-based welfare is 
taken into account. They also point to evidence 
that increasing housing wealth inequalities 
adversely affect the productivity and stabil-
ity of economies and contribute to deeper 
recessions. In short, they argue that these 
inequalities matter.
Our second article is the whimsically titled 
Housing and urban development in France 
under the sword of Damocles of present and 
future medical crises. In this valuable article 
Jean-Pierre Schaefer returns to the Covid-19 
theme that has been prominent in HFI through-
out this year. Schaefer points out that in spite 
of interruptions to residential building, overall 
development levels remain within historical 
parameters. He then goes on to discuss a 
number of issues raised by the pandemic 
or highlighted by it, including the need for 
outside space around homes, overcrowding, 
issues relating to housing for the elderly and 
a shift in preferences towards rural rather 
than urban locations.
Still on the theme of Covid-19, we are pleased 
to welcome back Marina Khmelnitskaya to 
the pages of Housing Finance International 
(HFI), this time along with two co-authors, 
Aleksandra Burdyak and Olga Pushina. Titled 
Russian housing at a time of Covid: the impact, 
policy response and legal trends, the article 
examines the impact of the disease on housing 
markets, the measures taken by government 
to alleviate impacts and the implications for 
legal practice and policy discussion in Russia.
Incremental housing presents both opportuni-
ties and challenges in terms of development 
in the third world, where it often predomi-
nates. In his article Evaluation of incremental 
housing development in Ado-Ekiti, Nigeria, 
Adewale Yoade returns to the pages of HFI to 
present the fascinating results of a survey of 
residents of incremental housing in Ado-Ekiti, 
Nigeria. The survey offers some significant 
new insights in terms of resident preferences 
and satisfaction.
It has become almost a truism that successful 
development of affordable housing is not just 
about bricks and mortar. Nevertheless, mis-
takes continue to be made and it is important 
to illustrate truths that may be known in theory 
but are frequently not respected in practice. 
Nigel Hyde and Clive Thursfield illustrate the 
requirements for a community that works in 
their article Destiny Village, Sierra Leone: a 
comprehensive, sustainable and holistic relo-
cation approach that can transform a nation. 
 It is heartening to be able to report on a 
positive outcome in a war-torn country, which 
is also beset by poverty and which has been 
struck by Ebola.
Our final article also pursues the theme of 
what is necessary for successful development, 
although this time the focus shifts to Morocco. 
In his article Towards Cities without Slums: 
A Sustainable Policy Approach for Morocco, 
Noor Mazhar reminds us that there is a global 
population shift towards the cities and that one 
third of the world’s urban population currently 
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Before signing off on the last issue of the 
journal for 2020, it only remains to offer all 
our readers our best wishes for the festive 
season and for the New Year. The pandemic 
has made 2020 a tough year for all of us, 
but it has been tougher still for those already 
feeling the effects of climate change, political 
uncertainty and economic turbulence. Let us 
all commit to making 2021 a year in which 
we turn a corner with Covid-19 and continue 
to address some of the other critical issues 
facing our global community.
Andrew Heywood
December 2020
6 HOUSING FINANCE INTERNATIONAL Winter 2020
Contributors’ biographies
a Commonwealth Scholar. Noor has held 
several research positions and internships 
in think-tanks, academic institutions, and 
public sector organizations. 
Tobias Peter is the director of research at 
the American Enterprise Institute’s Housing 
Center, where he focuses on housing risk 
and mortgage markets. He has a master’s 
in public policy from the Harvard Kennedy 
School and a bachelor’s degree in history 
and applied economics from The College of 
St. Scholastica.
Edward Pinto is an American Enterprise 
Institute (AEI) resident fellow and director 
of AEI’s Housing Center.  The Center moni-
tors the US markets using a unique set of 
housing market indicators. Active in housing 
finance for 44 years, he was an Executive 
Vice-President and Chief Credit officer for 
Fannie Mae until the late 1980s.
Olga Pushina is a PhD candidate at the 
Faculty of Law, University of Lapland, 
Finland. The fields of her research interests 
are socio-economic rights in the jurispru-
dence of the European Court of Human 
Rights and protection of the right to hous-
ing in Russia. 
Zaigham M. Rizvi is currently serving as 
Secretary General of the Asia-Pacific Union 
of Housing Finance and is an expert con-
sultant on housing and housing finance to 
international agencies including the World 
Bank/IFC. He is a career development 
finance banker with extensive experience 
in the field of housing and housing finance 
spread over more than 25 countries in Africa, 
the Middle-East, South-Asia, East-Asia and 
the Pacific. He has a passion for low-cost 
affordable housing for economically weaker 
sections of society, with a regional focus on 
Asia-Pacific and MENA. 
EMAIL: zaigham2r@yahoo.com
Jean-Pierre Schaefer, 68, is a gradu-
ate engineer of Ecole Centrale Lille, holds 
Master’s degrees in Economic Science (Lille) 
and Urban Planning (IUP-Paris). A former 
economist at the Caisse des Dépôts (France), 
he has a wide expertise on housing markets 
and urban development in France, Europe 
and foreign countries. He is vice-president 
of SOLIHA Yvelines Essonne.  
Dr Adriana Mihaela Soaita is a Research 
Fellow at the University of Glasgow. She is also 
a Romanian chartered architect and planner. 
Adriana is particularly interested in the individ-
uals’ experienced nexus between housing (and 
home), socioeconomic and spatial inequalities 
on which she has published widely.
Clive Thursfield is the deputy CEO of Home 
Leone. He was a Consultant Clinical Scientist 
in the British NHS for 45 years, specialising 
in rehabilitation and latterly was Director 
of Research for a Healthcare Trust. He is 
a committed Christian. He has consider-
able experience in the disciplines of clinical, 
leadership and managerial.
Mark Weinrich holds graduate degrees in 
political science and economics from the 
University of Freiburg, Germany. He is the 
General Secretary of the International Union 
for Housing Finance and the manager for 
international public affairs at the Association 
of Private German Bausparkassen.
Adewale Olufunlola Yoade holds a Ph.D in 
Urban and Regional Planning from Obafemi 
Awolowo University Ile-Ife, Nigeria. He lec-
tures in the Department of Urban and Regional 
Planning, Wesley University Ondo, Nigeria. His 
research focuses on housing, urban renewal 
and community development. He is a Member 
of Nigerian Institute of Planners (NMITP) and 
a Registered Town Planner (RTP).
 Winter 2020 HOUSING FINANCE INTERNATIONAL 27
The social and economic consequences of housing wealth inequalities 
The social and economic consequences 
of housing wealth inequalities 
 By Adriana Mihaela Soaita, Duncan Maclennan and Kenneth Gibb
1.  Do housing wealth inequalities 
matter? 
Housing is an important component of house-
hold wealth. The growth of homeownership in 
many countries, associated with high house 
price growth, has arguably reduced wealth 
inequality between homeowners while con-
tributing to greater inequality between tenants, 
homeowners and landlords. These patterns 
have strengthened since the 1980s, and 
particularly after 2000. The resulting hous-
ing wealth inequalities, and their social and 
economic consequences, within and between 
generations, across social classes, gender and 
ethnicity, and between spatial divisions cannot 
be anymore ignored (Maclennan and Miao 
2017; Piketty 2014; Soaita and Searle 2016). 
Such inequalities matter for many reasons, 
for example:
  The accumulation of housing assets is 
increasingly important to households’ 
ability to provide for their welfare, whether 
during retirement or for a range of wishes 
or misfortunes. The positioning of hous-
ing wealth as a base for family welfare is 
now referred to as ‘asset-based welfare’ 
(Sherraden 2005), which individualises 
the more traditional trade-off between 
state-subsidised access to homeowner-
ship or provision of a state-subsidised 
pension system (Castles 1998). It follows 
that declining rates of homeownership 
signal reduced opportunities or even old 
age poverty for some.
  Rising house prices have increased wealth 
not only through homeownership but 
also through landlordism. Rising house 
prices have facilitated equity extraction 
through re-mortgaging of existing prop-
erty and led to significant increases in 
Buy-to-Let (BTL) landlordism in countries 
such as the UK, Canada and Australia 
(Soaita et al. 2017). The growth of BTL 
landlordism, often reinforced by flows 
of capital from overseas international 
investors (Maclennan et al. 2019), also 
displaces first-time-buyers by driving up 
prices and forcing households to stay 
longer in rental housing. 
  Access to homeownership is increas-
ingly dependent on intergenerational 
transfers of family property wealth. The 
transmission of existing housing wealth 
inequalities to younger generations has 
implications for social mobility, aug-
menting the unequal life opportunities of 
young people (Lersch and Dewilde 2015; 
McKnight and Karagiannaki 2013).
 These socioeconomic inequalities reflect
the generational and class effects of a 
changing ethos in state policies, includ-
ing in relation to austerity, education, 
labour markets, housing and welfare 
(Christophers 2018). They also create 
marked disparities in the geographies of 
accumulation and distribution of housing 
wealth across and within regions, cities 
and neighbourhoods. 
In this paper we review existing evidence 
on the social and economic implications of 
housing wealth inequalities at the level of the 
household. More briefly, we also draw atten-
tion to emerging macroeconomic concerns 
about rising house prices and growing housing 
wealth inequalities as they affect the produc-
tivity and stability of economies (Maclennan 
et al. 2018; Maclennan et al. 2019; O’Sullivan 
and Gibb 2012).
2.  Institutional context, 
method and geographical 
representation
Diverse welfare regimes: Clearly, the nature 
and impact of housing wealth inequalities to 
households depend on broader institutional 
arrangements, and particularly on the wider 
arrangements for welfare. The coverage, 
eligibility and generosity of state welfare 
arrangements affect households’ require-
ment to use up their housing wealth in times 
of misfortune (e.g. spells of unemployment, 
illness, divorce, bereavement) or to rent during 
retirement. The idea that the diverse welfare 
arrangements between state, market and 
family show important affinities by groups of 
countries was launched by Esping-Anderson 
(1990) through the idea of ‘welfare regimes’. 
He differentiated between three regimes: the 
Liberal (Anglo-Saxon) that gives an important 
role to the market, social assistance being 
means-tested, inadequate and difficult to 
access; the Social-Democrat (Nordic) where 
state welfare is far reaching and generous; and 
the Corporatist (Central Europe) that is situated 
in between, with the family being the main 
welfare provider and where social benefits are 
means-tested but more generous than in the 
Liberal regime. Other welfare regimes have 
since gained recognition, relevant here being 
the Mediterranean (Southern European) and 
the Post-Communist (Eastern Europe) ones, 
both of which rely on family for the provision of 
welfare, the latter having a particular reliance 
on outright homeownership. 
Diverse housing regimes: The arrangements 
by which housing is regulated, financed, 
consumed and produced are also country 
specific. For instance, the wealth potential of 
homeownership, second-home ownership or 
landlordism relates to housing finance (e.g. 
type of banks and their offers; state support for 
mortgages; degree of financial deregulation), 
non-financialized access to housing (e.g. self-
provision; intergenerational sharing of space), 
the stock’s quality and availability within and 
between tenures, and property taxation. 
To ease cross-country comparison, we bor-
row the idea that these housing arrangements 
– and their links to welfare – suggest a series 
of shared features across groups of countries. 
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For instance, Kemeny’s (2006) differentiation 
between renting and homeownership societies, 
including by the relationship/size between the 
private and social renting sectors. While there 
is no simple relationship between welfare and 
housing regimes, the Social-Democrat and 
Corporatist regimes have much more regulated 
and secure private renting markets compared 
to the Liberal and Post-Communist ones. 
Likewise, outright homeownership dominates 
the Mediterranean and particularly the Post-
Communist housing regimes. While housing 
regimes have evolved faster with increased 
provision by the markets, welfare arrange-
ments have been more enduring, having thus 
implications for how housing wealth is relied 
upon by households.
Method: Piloting systematic online literature 
searches (Soaita et al. 2019b), we noticed 
that a focus on Anglo-Saxon and EU countries 
reduced the retrieved literature by less than 
10%; and a focus on the period 2008-2019 
by 20% (publications in English only). Taking 
these criteria in our final searches and adding 
additional literature,1 we located 429 relevant 
publications. Based on thematic relevance, 
125 references were reviewed (Soaita et al. 
2019a). Figure 1 shows the number of times 
each country was referred to across the 
125 publications, grouped by welfare regimes.2 
In this paper, we also refer to some additional 
studies to set the broader context or introduce 
updates. 
3. Findings
3.1. The comparative context 
While house price growth tends to act as a 
mechanism of increasing inequality across 
homeowners and between property haves 
and have-nots – and conversely when there 
are declining house prices –understanding 
the ways in which domestic institutions and 
policy frameworks shape both access to hous-
ing wealth and house price growth remains 
a complex question. For instance, charting 
homeownership levels without capturing 
households’ net equity, mortgage indebted-
ness and mortgage subsidies; housing quality 
relative to households’ needs; or without pay-
ing attention to legacies of past policies and 
the wider market context, risk misjudging 
the picture. Lack of data (and of in-depth 
knowledge) often precludes diving into such 
complexities in international comparisons. 
Yet comparative work is particularly useful to 
understand enduring differences and changing 
patterns between countries related to their 
institutional contexts. We wish to particularly 
highlight two studies here (of the 29 that 
advanced comparative analyses) but others 
will be referred to later.
Comparing the distribution of net housing wealth 
in 16 European countries – across occupa-
tional classes, ethnicity and for two cohorts (the 
19860s-80s buyers versus post-1980 ones) – 
Wind et al. (2017) proposed the idea of ‘housing 
wealth accumulation regimes’. They found that 
growing homeownership levels in deregulated, 
market-based housing systems (i.e. the Liberal 
regime in Figure 1) are associated with higher 
housing wealth inequality across occupational 
classes, as lower-income buyers buy more ‘mar-
ginal’ housing. Conversely, when the state or the 
family enable access to homeownership (e.g. 
Right-to-Buy, mortgage support or self-build), 
labour-market income decouples from housing 
consumption, giving a more equal distribution 
of housing wealth. They concluded that:
  Family-based provision of housing through 
self-build and pooled resources (e.g. 
Belgium, Greece, Italy, Portugal, the post-
communist states) and the privatisation of 
public rental housing (e.g. UK’s Right-to-
Buy and similar policies in Eastern Europe) 
is associated with less housing wealth 
inequality than market provision.
  State subsidies for homeownership might 
reduce housing wealth inequality between 
occupational classes (e.g. Denmark, 
Sweden, Netherlands), being associated 
with a more equal distribution of housing 
wealth. 
Looking at housing wealth versus savings 
across the life-course, Lersch and Dewilde 
(2018) compared the UK with Germany, that 
is, respectively, a country with a longstanding 
record of high real house price appreciation 
versus a housing market with historically 
stable real house prices (until about 2010); 
more deregulated versus more regulated mort-
gage and rental markets; and a less versus a 
more generous welfare regime. The authors 
observed that, in both countries, homeowner-
ship is selective (i.e. only those of medium/
higher income are able to access mortgage 
markets) and that homeowners are doubly 
advantaged as they accumulate both finan-
cial wealth and housing wealth independently 
(more so in the UK than Germany given the 
former’s higher house price growth).
Germany and the UK represent many of the 
extremes of approaches to housing as a means 
of capital accumulation. In a world of stable 
house price (i.e. Germany), homeownership 
may boost wealth as households first save to 
acquire a larger entry-deposit (hence also pay-
ing less to finance mortgage costs) and then by 
repaying the mortgage. This is the traditional 
‘savings’ approach to mortgaged homeown-
ership. Conversely, in contexts of high house 
price appreciation greater than that of incomes 
(i.e. UK), wealth accumulation in housing has 
FIGURE 1    Country representation in the reviewed literature
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Liberal Social- 
Democrat
Corporatist Mediteraneean Post-Communist
NZ
L
IR
L
CA
N
AU
S
US
A
GB
R
NO
R
DN
K
FI
N
SW
E
CH
E
LU
X
AU
T
BE
L
FR
A
NL
D
DE
U 
CY
P
M
LT
GR
C
PR
T
ES
P
IT
A
BG
R
LV
A
RO
M
RU
S
LT
U
SV
K
ES
T
PO
L
HU
N
CZ
E 
SV
N
2
6 6 6 67 7
11 13 10 11
13
17
4 4 2 2 31 12 2 3
4 5 5
1 1
8 99
12
20
60
1  Given that our review was part of a UK-focused research project, these additional publications 
have significantly increased the representation of the UK. As 29 publications were comparative 
cross-country analyses (involving between two to 22 countries) the numbers in Figure 1 exceed 
the number of publications reviewed.
2  We refrain from revisiting here the details of the longstanding debate regarding a country 
belonging (or not) to different regime types. Suffice to say that our country grouping was 
commonly used in the reviewed literature.
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been primarily driven by rising prices (which 
has also encouraged re-mortgaging). This is 
the ‘speculative’ approach to mortgaged home-
ownership and BTL landlordism. Conversely, in 
the Mediterranean and Post-Communist groups, 
where self-build, outright transactions with 
family-pooled resources and intergenerational 
co-residence dominate, housing is predomi-
nately perceived as a family home rather than 
housing wealth (Soaita 2015). We label this the 
‘non-financialised’ approach to homeownership. 
These approaches inform the following sec-
tion, which focuses on households’ behaviour 
in relation to their housing wealth.
3.2. Asset-based welfare (ABW)
We know that homeownership has been histori-
cally supported by states through various subsidies 
(e.g. mortgage interest relief, tax exemptions, sub-
sidised loans, state-backed equity loans, and Right 
to Buy discounts3). Households could theoretically 
position their housing wealth as a base for family 
welfare in two major ways. Both, the traditional 
 savings approach to mortgage homeownership 
and the non-financialised approach to outright 
homeownership centre on rent-free living, being 
driven by a motivational mix of aging in place (the 
‘home’ motive), precautionary saving (e.g. risks of 
old-age care or periods of adversity, with housing 
wealth liquidised via downsizing) and bequeathing. 
Conversely, in the speculative approach house-
holds engage actively in the accumulation and 
de-accumulation of housing wealth over the 
life-course by combining residential mobility 
(i.e. upsizing over the working age to downsize 
in retirement) with innovative financial prod-
ucts (e.g. re-mortgage, equity release, reversed 
mortgages). Pushing mortgage debt into later 
life, this approach makes housing wealth more 
liquid, hence enabling households to finance a 
more comfortable lifestyle or to mitigate adver-
sity (e.g. unemployment, sickness, divorce) 
while ideally still maintaining a reserve for 
precautionary saving and inheritance. 
The literature reviewed shows, however, very 
mixed results on the effectiveness of position-
ing housing wealth as a base for family welfare. 
To exemplify, we focus first on ABW’s ability 
to co-finance retirement and adversity; and 
second on the implications of housing wealth 
inequality to ABW solutions. 
3.2.1.  CO-FINANCING RETIREMENT  
AND ADVERSITY
Focusing on the case of Australia, Castles 
(1998) argued that governments can trade-off 
between subsidising homeownership or the 
pension system. Delfani et al. (2014) revis-
ited the argument by examining 22 countries. 
They found that in countries with generous 
housing-related subsidies and generous 
state-regulated/provided pension systems 
(e.g. Austria, France, Germany, Luxembourg), 
households do not need to trade-off housing 
wealth and pension; welfare outcomes for the 
elderly are least unequal. Similar outcomes 
were found in countries with market-based 
housing but generous state-regulated/provided 
pensions (e.g. Denmark, Finland, Netherlands, 
Norway, Switzerland, Sweden).
Only in countries where both housing and 
pensions are provided by the market (e.g. 
Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, UK, USA), 
housing wealth indeed complements the wel-
fare package of the elderly, particularly for 
middle-income households since the higher-
income do not need it (they have both) and 
the lower-income cannot access it (they have 
none). Housing wealth and pension wealth 
inequalities reinforce each other in these 
countries. The authors argue that generous 
pensions rather than owner-occupation allevi-
ate old-age poverty; however, in the absence 
of the former, outright owner-occupation helps 
reduce poverty (e.g. in the Mediterranean and 
post-communist countries). 
The above findings are supported by a host 
of other robust studies. Blundell et al. (2016) 
examined the housing/pension wealth trajec-
tory of households aged 70 and over in the 
USA and England. While Americans retirees 
were richer than their English counterparts,4 
they also liquidated their wealth much faster 
between 2002 and 2010 not least because 
higher house price appreciation in England 
offset the use of non-housing wealth. They 
noted striking wealth inequalities in later life 
in both countries: the richest 33% of retir-
ees spend faster to maintain their lifestyle 
whereas the poorest 33% of retirees just save 
enough to pay for a funeral. This latter group of 
arguably housing-richer/income-poorer house-
holds refused to spend their housing wealth 
to improve their wellbeing. While the authors 
suggested a range of explanatory motives for 
this traditional behaviour, qualitative research 
substantiates them. 
In a qualitative study of older Britons involved 
in equity release, Fox O’Mahony and Overton 
(2015) evidenced reluctance to withdraw hous-
ing wealth stirred by a desire to bequeath and 
to age in place in a debt-free home. Participants 
felt guilt for spending their children’s inherit-
ance and discomfort about indebtedness. 
Nonetheless, having enough space to host 
memorabilia and retaining support networks 
(including overnight visitors) precluded down-
sizing and motivated equity release. Similar 
findings were substantiated for the case of 
Belgium (De Decker and Dewilde 2010). 
In a quantitative longitudinal study of British 
(pre)retirees, French et al. (2018) also noted 
reluctance to withdraw housing wealth. While 
between 40% (London) to 77% (North East) 
of pre-retirees expected to downsize and 14% 
expected to withdraw equity, less than 2% had 
done so eight years later. People withdrew 
housing wealth only in situations of financial 
hardship and sudden adversity. The authors 
argued that conventional economic rational-
ity explained almost entirely the ‘method’ of 
withdrawing housing wealth: downsizing was 
more common for households whose house 
value was high relative to regional values and 
equity release more common for older house-
holds (becoming less expensive with age). 
The same reluctance to take a reverse mortgage 
or engage in equity borrowing was evidenced by 
Costa-Font et al (2010) in Spain among those 
aged 55 and over; and by Wood et al. (2013) in 
the UK and Australia for people of all ages. All 
studies showed that housing wealth was with-
drawn to mitigate exceptional and key welfare 
needs (e.g. sudden drop in income, relationship 
breakdown, health issues, old-age care, child-
birth, the entry to homeownership of children 
but not for long-term health issues or death of 
a spouse which are more ‘insurable’ events). 
Wood et al. (2013) conclude that equity borrow-
ing plays a welfare-switching role away from 
collective resources for welfare and a means 
to cover uninsurable events. 
Relationship breakdown is one such uninsur-
able event. Four reviewed studies looked at 
this matter in detail. Taken together, it can be 
said that positive net housing wealth may pro-
vide a short-term safety-net in case of divorce/
dissolution. Divorced owners are more likely 
to exit homeownership in later life or have 
significantly less housing wealth, particularly 
so in countries where entry in homeownership 
is more selective (e.g. Denmark, Austria and 
the Netherlands) but less so in countries with 
broad mortgage markets (e.g. Australia and 
the UK), generous welfare benefits and larger 
female employment (e.g. Austria, France and 
Germany). There is a gender effect: divorced 
males are more likely to re-enter homeown-
ership and less likely to suffer prolonged 
3  Referring to the British model of council house sales to sitting tenants, colloquially known as 
the ‘right to buy’. Similar policies of privatisation were applied in the post-communist countries.
4  These differences reflect the cumulative effect of very different systems of social security, 
occupational pension and tax relief. Capturing such detailed differences is part of the challenge 
of comparative analysis across countries.
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financial hardship in the long-term; and the 
owned home can become a financial burden 
for females who face difficulties in paying the 
mortgage. While country specific, the negative 
(housing) wealth consequences of divorce 
seem to persist in the long run – significantly 
more for people of lower income/education 
levels and for women. 
The above examples of co-financing retire-
ment and adversity indicate that the potential 
of ABW depends on the broader institutional 
environment (particularly welfare and labour 
markets) and on the socioeconomic position 
of households. Together these determine 
whether a household wishes, needs and indeed 
can withdraw housing wealth, with those on 
lower-income being less in a position to do 
so effectively or at all. The next section looks 
more in-depth at the ABW implications of hous-
ing wealth inequalities.
3.2.2.  PROPERTY RICH, POOR  
AND HAVE-NOTS
Tenants are by definition excluded from ABW 
and it is clear they cannot compensate through 
other means. For instance, looking at private 
insurance take-up in the UK, Soaita and Searle 
(2018) found that affluent homeowners were 
insured against every major risk such as death, 
unemployment, illness, building and contents, 
and lacked the only insurance relatively popu-
lar among tenants, that for funeral expenses. 
Likewise,  comparing ‘otherwise-similar’ ten-
ants and homeowners in the UK and Germany, 
where access to homeownership is selective, 
Lersch and Dewilde (2018) demonstrate that 
it is not consumption behaviour, values or 
preferences that explain the ability to save 
towards entry into homeownership but rather 
the financial position of people and their fami-
lies. They found no ‘trade-off’ between savings 
through financial products or saving thorough 
homeownership. Homeowners, therefore, are 
multiple advantaged as they independently 
accumulate financial and housing wealth while 
being covered against ‘rainy days’ whereas 
tenants face multiple disadvantages (even 
more so in the UK where house price growth 
is substantial and rents are higher than mort-
gage payments). 
But financially-stressed/’marginal’ homeowners 
are also de facto excluded from the possibilities 
of ABW. Two UK studies (Koppe 2017; Soaita 
and Searle 2018) compared affluent homeown-
ers with marginal homeowners and tenants 
who fell out of homeownership, finding that the 
last two groups were more likely to be self-/
temporarily employed and to have experienced 
unlucky life events, such as illness, domestic 
violence, relationship breakdown prior to the 
accumulation of any net equity. Koppe (2017) 
showed that marginal homeowners in the UK 
make up 10% of all homeowners; of these, 
about 2% struggled to pay their mortgages; 
4% dropped out from homeownership without 
re-entry and the remaining 4% succeeded in re-
entering. Demographically, they were more likely 
to be female, younger, experience a relationship 
breakdown, have high mortgage debt to income 
ratio and a second child in the household. 
The possibilities for ABW depend on the highly 
unpredictable capital gains accrued between 
the moment of buying and that of need. 
Wind and Hedman’s (2018) Swedish study 
demonstrates that higher-income individuals 
realise higher capital gains compared to lower-
income/migrant households as the former buy 
in more advantaged neighbourhoods, which 
record higher house price growth than the dis-
advantaged neighbourhoods where the former 
can afford to buy. However, the fact that the 
costs of servicing the mortgage significantly 
‘eat’ from the accrued capital gains is rarely 
taken into consideration; hence the lifecycle 
of the mortgage matters. Soaita and Searle 
(2016) showed that the costs of borrowing 
also advantages home-buyers in higher price 
growth areas as these costs wipe out a much 
lower proportion of gross capital gains (i.e. one 
third on average) than in lower price growth 
area (i.e. two-thirds on average). 
FIGURE 2    House price recovery in Europe: 2018 compared to 2007
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Source: by the authors (data based on HYPOSTAT 2019, Map 2, p. 30)
Source: By the authors, data sources: Europe (Eurostat 2020), Australia (https://www.aihw.gov.au/reports/australias-welfare/home-ownership-
and-housing-tenure); Data for CAN, NZL and USA was broken on owners and renters only.
FIGURE 3    Households’ tenure by countries and welfare regime
100
80
60
40
20
0
IR
L 
GB
R
NZ
L
CA
N
AU
S
US
A
FI
N
DN
K
SW
E
NO
R
CH
E
LU
X
AU
T
BE
L
FR
A
NL
D
DE
U
CY
P
M
LT
GR
C
PR
T
ES
P
IT
A
RO
M
BG
R
SV
N
LV
A
LT
U
HU
N
SV
K
CZ
E
ES
T
PO
L
Liberal Social- 
Democrat
Corporatist Mediteraneean Post-Communist
 Mortgaged PRS Outright
 Winter 2020 HOUSING FINANCE INTERNATIONAL 31
The social and economic consequences of housing wealth inequalities 
The vagaries of a volatile housing market and 
the lifecycle of the mortgage at the moment 
of need limit therefore the property ‘haves’ 
options for ABW. Figure 2 shows that in 2018, a 
decade after the start of the GFC, the average 
house price had not yet recovered in seven 
European countries (while in six values were 
much higher in 2007, by between 140% and 
170%). Figure 3 shows that a significant pro-
portion of homeowners are still paying off 
their mortgages in the first three groups of 
countries, being therefore theoretically more 
exposed to market risks with accrued equity 
(through repaid mortgage and capital growth) 
being obviously still below their current home 
value but not necessarily negative (significant 
incidence of negative equity was reported in 
the NL). The last two country-groups make a 
stark contrast with their widespread levels of 
outright homeownership.
Arundel (2017) looked at net housing wealth in 
the UK across all property haves (homeown-
ers, second-home owners and landlords). He 
found that during 2006 and 2012 net housing 
wealth became concentrated among fewer 
property-have households. By 2012, the top 
20% of property-have households owned over 
60% of all national housing net equity, while 
the top 40% held over 85%. He argues that 
this pattern of concentration is being gener-
ated by redistribution from housing-poor to 
housing-rich households (rather than new-built 
housing), a process driven by the constraints 
faced by first-time buyers and the expansion 
of landlordism – a topic to which we turn later. 
The evaporating opportunities of lower/middle-
class households and the increased post-GFC 
inequality resulted in 95% of all wealth gains 
going to the top 1% of the property-rich house-
holds. These inequality trends play further 
at both inter- and intra-generational levels, 
affecting the younger cohorts and lower-
income of all ages. 
Other studies (e.g. Christophers 2018) likewise 
see generational differences as outcomes of 
more fundamental inequalities (e.g. those of 
income from labour markets) and political 
choices (e.g. regressive redistribution,  labour 
precarity, financial deregulation) that have 
affected old and young, but particularly the 
poor, the un-skilled and early labour-market 
entrants. Family solidarity has responded to 
this landscape of reduced opportunities and 
shrinking welfare states by pooling space, 
care-time and money across family genera-
tions. To this we now turn.
3.3.  Intergenerational inequalities and 
family solidarity
Housing has been a key part of the debate 
on intergenerational inequalities, particularly 
between ‘baby-boomers’ and ’millennials’ with 
some commentators promoting the idea of 
‘generational war’ (Kotlikoff 1992). It is widely 
agreed that one effect of rising house prices is 
the lower likelihood of younger birth cohorts 
to enter homeownership5 and the increase in 
housing wealth of older birth cohorts. The lat-
ter has also increased the likelihood of passing 
down generation significant wealth through 
inheritances and gifts (Hamnett 1991).
The international literature on intergenerational 
transfers is growing and helps understand 
how inter- and intragenerational inequali-
ties consolidate in a country-specific ways. 
Not unexpectedly, in countries in which both 
housing wealth and income inequalities are 
relatively small, and access to education inclu-
sive, the impact is small, e.g. in the Czech 
Republic and Norway (Gulbrandsen and 
Sandlie 2015; Lux et al. 2018). Conversely, 
in societies where homeownership is highly 
stratified, e.g. in Germany and the UK, inter-
generational transfers sharply reinforce overall 
inequalities, limiting social mobility (Koppe 
2018; Lennartz and Helbrecht 2018). 
Parental gifts are offered for many reasons (e.g. 
to support access to education, rental costs, 
clear debt) but higher value transfers are given 
to assist entry in homeownership and even land-
lordism (Soaita et al. 2017). These transfers are 
not only unequal – wealthier recipients receiv-
ing higher gifts than their poorer counterparts, 
allowing for an earlier entry in homeownership 
(Barrett et al. 2015) – but trigger a ‘wealth-
effect’ over the life-course, including through 
house price appreciation (Hills et al. 2013).
However, the number of people who received 
gifts and inheritances is small. Across five 
European countries,6 5.4% on average have 
ever received large financial support of whom 
2% once only and 3.4% regularly (Emery 
2018). In the period 2002-12 in Australia 
(Barrett et al. 2015), only 6% of individuals 
aged 25-65 received financial gifts and 1.4% 
received an inheritance. However, in Australia, 
receipt of an intergenerational transfer had an 
important effect: it doubled the likelihood of 
entering homeownership compared to non-
receipt; and recipients were more likely to buy 
higher value homes than their un-supported 
counterparts. Parental assistance was more 
likely to be offered from and for expensive 
house-price areas, hence transfers were trig-
gered and likely to trigger a wealth effect via 
higher capital gains from parents to children.
However, Cigdem and Whelan (2017) note that 
intergenerational transfers play a much more 
important role in facilitating homeownership 
for those at the margins, who would have 
been unable to buy unassisted. Policy-wise, 
encouraging families to direct gifts to those 
who need them most would be advisable 
albeit running against cultural norms of equal 
transfers between and exclusively to children 
(Soaita and Searle 2018).  
Across studies, results are somewhat mixed 
and clearly country specific on the extent to 
which intergenerational transfers increase 
inequalities. For instance for the UK, Koppe 
(2018) finds very small effects of inheritance 
on the likelihood of children acquiring their first 
home in the UK (not least because inheritances 
are received later in life), which is supported 
by Dewilde, et al.’s study (2018) that find 
small effects of intergenerational transfers in 
increasing inequality. Conversely for the case 
of Germany, Lennartz and Helbrecht (2018) 
show that financial gifts influence access to 
homeownership. Such results should be quali-
fied by the complex reality that the stratifying 
impact of family background is transmitted 
through enduring generational continuities in 
human capital, income, and occupation; and 
that small gifts in early life (e.g. education 
support) trigger a wealth effect that shadow 
the effect of later gifts or inheritance. 
For the case of the UK, Rowlingson et al (2017) 
note that gift-giving and receiving is more 
prominent among the middle-classes than 
working-classes and that only 2% of financial 
gifts were sourced from housing wealth (by 
downsizing or re-mortgaging), with savings 
and income being the most common source. 
The great majority of recipients said parental 
financial assistance made a (very) great dif-
ference to their lives, particularly so among 
those aged 16-39. The authors conclude that 
intergenerational support:
enables families to secure the next genera-
tion in a similar social class position. Thus, 
as family support increases in some families, 
with the withdrawal of state welfare, existing 
inequalities between families are widened 
and social mobility in society is reduced.
5  For instance, Fuller et al. (2019) note that between the late 1970s and early 2010s, homeownership 
rates among 25-34 years old fell by a quarter in France, by nearly half in Denmark, Germany, 
Spain, the UK and the US, and by almost two-thirds in Italy. In the UK, they argued, the cost of 
a first home has risen from 2.7 to 5.2 years of earnings between 1983 and 2015.
6 AUT, FRA, DEU, BGR, CZE
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There is indeed considerable policy interest 
in the extent to which social mobility is upset 
and the role that (wealth) inequalities play. 
However, as in other areas associated with 
wealth inequality, identifying and isolating the 
independent effect of wealth and advantage 
in upsetting social mobility is a challenging 
analytical problem. 
McKnight and Karagiannaki’s (2013) study 
goes some way to overcome these issues. They 
found a strong relationship between parental 
wealth (especially housing wealth) and chil-
dren’s educational outcomes on to earnings 
and employment. They also found that young 
people holding assets via inter-generational 
transfers or investments have a positive dif-
ferential impact on progress in employment, 
earnings, health and well-being. This is only 
one, admittedly careful, empirical study but 
is indicative that housing wealth does have 
a powerful set of impacts on social mobility.
3.4. Landlordism
The private rented sector (PRS) – now growing 
in many countries – was generally portrayed 
as a tenure option for tenants rather than a 
welfare or investment strategy for landlords, 
even in countries where the sector has been 
historically large such as Australia and the 
US, and large and subsidised as in Germany. 
Some of the driving forces that entice people 
to become landlords are country specific, e.g. 
financial deregulation and the retreat of the 
welfare state in the case of the UK and Norway7 
(Maclennan et al. 2016). BTL mortgages, popu-
lar during the last two decades in the UK and 
Australia, allow portfolio expansion by extract-
ing equity from an owned property to be used 
as a deposit to purchase a new one (a move 
enabled by high house price growth rather than 
paid off mortgage debt). Families responded 
to the retreat of the welfare state with ABW 
strategies based on homeownership but also 
on landlordism. Inheritances also contributed 
to the growth of landlordism (e.g. 9% of rented 
dwellings are inherited in the UK). 
Other drivers are increasingly global, e.g. 
the circulation of capital in search of scarce 
higher returns generating overseas ownership 
of rental housing (Fields 2018; Maclennan and 
Miao 2017). Indeed, global policies of low-
interest rates resulted in historically low returns 
in alternative investment products (e.g. shares, 
bonds and savings), positioning residential 
property into a new asset class accessible 
to individuals. Cross-country landlordism is 
a particularly understudied phenomenon as 
are the returns of BTL landlordism. Finally, 
we should not ignore the increased demand 
for renting that has been produced by short-
age of social housing; the precarisation of 
labour (Christophers 2018; Crawford and 
McKee 2018); migration; the toxic interplay 
between low-pay and high-rents, precluding 
young people from saving for a deposit; more 
stringent mortgage-entry requirements; and 
increased demand for (expensive) education in 
order to improve one’s labour market position 
(McKee et al. 2019; Soaita and McKee 2019). 
However, studies on landlords are patchy. While 
evidence has recently grown, it displays a clear 
UK and Australian empirical bias (Scanlon and 
Whitehead 2016; Wallace and Rugg 2014), 
with international comparisons being based 
on expert knowledge rather than landlord data 
(Martin et al. 2018; Whitehead and Williams 
2018; Whitehead and Williams 2019). An excep-
tion is Wind et al.’s (2019) study on secondary 
property ownership (i.e. second-homes and PRS 
properties) in 20 European countries.
Wind et al. (2019) noted that secondary property 
ownership is held by a minority of households.8 
However, in 11 countries, this type of property 
makes a considerable share of households’ 
net property wealth of between 20% and 40% 
– hence, secondary property does not conform 
with ‘the stereotypical small and cheap holiday 
home’ (p.12). In the majority of sampled coun-
tries, and especially in the Mediterranean and 
post-communist ones, few of these are rented 
out, being used as holiday homes and homes 
for the extended family. High shares of landlords 
among secondary property owners were found 
in Ireland, Belgium, Germany (80% of all second 
property owners), France and Luxemburg (over 
50% of secondary property owners). It appears 
thus that landlordism is attractive in both the 
regulated PRS of the Corporatist regime and 
the free-market ones of the Liberal regimes. 
The authors note that in Belgium, Germany, 
France and Ireland, self-employed workers are 
more likely to become landlords than salaried 
workers as income-replacement rates through 
pensions for self-employed are low. In these 
countries therefore landlordism is a long-term 
welfare strategy of mitigating old-age poverty 
for some social groups. But in Ireland – as in the 
UK (Arundel 2017) – there is also an upswing 
of (BTL) landlordism among wealth-rich house-
holds. The authors concluded:
Landlordism has a different driver for the cor-
poratist-conservative welfare states (where 
landlordism has been a common strategy 
to supplement a lower income in later life 
for decades) and the liberal welfare states 
(where it is a relatively new phenomenon). 
In the latter, it is relatively skewed toward 
property speculation by relatively wealthy, but 
not necessarily self-employed (p.21).
Other studies supported the view that land-
lordism is a family welfare strategy for not 
particularly affluent landlords while being a 
(speculative) investment strategy for those afflu-
ent (Nethercote 2018; Soaita et al. 2017). Ronald 
and Kadi (2018) also observed this bifurcation for 
the case of the UK. Despite clear trends of prop-
erty-concentration in the hands of large-portfolio 
landlords,9 the authors note that over one million 
small-portfolio landlords have emerged in the 
last decade in the UK. This means that the sector 
has grown extensively (more people becom-
ing landlords) and intensively (some landlords 
acquiring more properties). 
Qualitative research (Bierre et al. 2010; Soaita 
et al. 2017) showed that small-portfolio land-
lords see their letting property as an ABW 
strategy, i.e. providing a pension supplement 
or a safety-net. They entered the market by 
chance (inheriting property; partnering), as a 
family strategy (‘Ma and Pa’ landlords) or to 
counteract the historically low interest rates on 
savings (Duffy et al. 2017). Some of these (still) 
small-portfolio landlords are young. Qualitative 
research showed that young landlords have ben-
efited from substantial family support, whether 
in non-financial forms (e.g. DIY, child care, liv-
ing in the parental home) or through financial 
gifts supporting early-entry in homeownership 
(Soaita et al. 2017) and combined with taking 
in lodgers (Soaita and McKee 2019; Soaita et 
al. 2017). Hence, family financial support trig-
gers wealth not only through homeownership 
but also through landlordism.
Conversely, large-portfolio landlords see land-
lordism as a business activity and a way to 
diversify their wealth portfolio (MHCLG 2019). 
These individuals have purposefully built their 
rental portfolio as a (side-line) business activity, 
7  This does not apply to enduring deregulated countries (e.g. Australia and the US) or enduring 
regulated countries (e.g. Germany, Netherlands, Sweden). In some countries, rent controls are 
a choice for states and provinces (or even some cities, e.g. New York, Toronto).
8  Between 4% and 10% of households in NDL, SLK, POL, AUT;  between 10% and 15% in 
IRL, SLV, GRC, ITA, HUN, DEU; and between 15% and 27% in  PRT, FRA, LTV, MLT, CYP, 
LUX, EST, FIN, ESP.
9  E.g. in 2010, 72% of landlords had just one rental property and only 6% had 4 or more 
properties (Lloyd 2013). By 2018, just under half of all individual landlords in England 
own one property for letting purposes and 17% had 5 or more units (owning almost half 
of all rented properties (MHCLG (2019). While data is not exactly comparable, it shows an 
increasing concentration of rented property since 2010.
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buying mostly with cash during the 1990s (and 
maintaining a low-debt portfolio) but increasingly 
with BTL mortgages after 2000 (some preferring 
high-debt expansion by re-mortgaging existing 
property). While landlords’ circumstances and 
socioeconomic profiles remain diverse, it is 
clear that landlordism remains and is becom-
ing even more concentrated among privileged 
households (Arundel 2017). While most land-
lords cannot be considered “super-rich” (Lloyd 
2013), a small share holds increasingly large 
rental portfolios, setting the stage for rentier 
capitalism, i.e. wealth being generated passively 
through rent from wealth rather than productive 
economic means (Piketty 2014).10 
3.5. Housing wealth, rising house prices 
and the economy
The arguments and evidence presented so far 
have focussed on the incidence and uses of 
housing wealth gains for individual households. 
Housing research has tended to focus upon the 
distributional, fairness and ABW consequences 
of housing wealth increases and shifts and 
reflected little upon the wider economic conse-
quences, including wealth and income effects, 
of these housing sector driven changes. 
There has been, however, a growing recogni-
tion that the gains driven by rising house prices 
have significant impacts on wider economic 
outcomes in metropolitan and macro-econ-
omies. We briefly summarise these insights 
below as some of the price rise effects may 
detract from societal wealth and income. We 
also believe it is important to draw attention to 
emerging work on these issues as economies 
and housing systems confront the economic 
consequences of the COVID 19 pandemic.
Rising house prices, driving increased housing 
wealth for some, are now seen to lie at the core 
of the crises of affordability for the homeless, 
low-income renters and younger potential home-
buyers that have significant consequences for 
public spending budgets (Maclennan et al. 2019). 
There is also now a growing concern that the 
same processes are increasing economic and 
financial instability in some economies and 
reducing growth and productivity in others, 
and in consequence slowing and distorting the 
gains from effort and innovation.
Some economists (e.g. Buiter 2010) argue 
that housing wealth shifts within economies 
have a marginal economic effect only, as the 
increased wealth of owners as prices rise 
translates into reduced income and wealth 
for non-owners, so that transfer effects cancel 
out. However, there is emerging evidence and 
concern that high and rising housing costs and 
rents can significantly shape the trajectory of 
economies. We noted (Soaita et al. 2019a) that 
strong evidence has accumulated over the last 
two decades demonstrating that rising housing 
wealth levels impact household consumption, 
with estimates of 5-10% of gains augmenting 
current household spending. Rather than a 
cause for celebration, this has the effect of 
exacerbating economic cycles, heightening 
booms and deepening recessions, with house 
price changes having thus pro-cyclical effects 
on consumer expectations and spending. 
Major international agencies, e.g. the IMF and 
the OECD, have also become increasingly con-
cerned about the rising ratios of household 
debt to GDP in the liberal economies that 
have accompanied rising home prices and 
high homeownership rates. In these economies 
– our first group of countries in Figure 1 – ris-
ing mortgage debts have driven rising total 
housing debt ratios and raised concerns in 
some national economies, including Canada, 
the UK and Australia. A negative shock to 
the national economy with consequent high 
unemployment – and COVID 19 seems set to 
induce deep negative shocks until 2023 – is 
likely to prompt mortgage defaults at scale and 
trap households in negative equity. Housing 
wealth losses may well dominate the next five 
years, hamper financial stability and drag down 
growth and recovery rates reducing national 
wealth below potential levels. 
In major metropolitan areas, especially in the 
liberal economies, the housing market pres-
sures and price surges – and consequent 
wealth gains for existing owners – are now 
recognised to have had negative effects on 
productivity and growth. Some macroeconomic 
estimates for the US suggest that metropolitan 
price increases have driven economic activ-
ity away from peak productivity localities and 
reduced GDP by between 3-4% (Glaeser and 
Gyurko 2018) and 10% (Hsieh and Moretti 
2019). Although there is much debate about 
the causes of metropolitan price changes, the 
consequences for households are now begin-
ning to be researched. For example, Maclennan 
et al (2019) have demonstrated how high house 
prices in Sydney have forced younger and mid-
dle income households to move further away 
from the densest areas of job opportunities and 
this has weakened the ‘matching’ processes 
in urban labour markets in ways that damage 
the long-term labour market rewards for such 
households. A wide programme of research on 
the impacts of higher housing costs on income 
growth and stability in Australia is now com-
mencing (Maclennan and Long 2020). 
There are emerging debates at metropolitan 
and national levels about the effects of housing 
prices on economies, including income and 
wealth growth in the productive sector. The 
focus on household housing wealth gains and 
their uses is important, but needs to be set in 
the context of a wider systemic understand-
ing of how housing outcomes, including the 
impact of house prices on the wealth creating 
strategies and capacities of cities and nations. 
There is a growing concern that rising house 
prices and individual housing wealth holdings 
are consuming the gains from agglomerating 
skills and innovation in metropolitan areas. 
And at the macroeconomic level, as economies 
now face major challenges of recovery and 
reconstruction, wealth growth based upon 
speculation and ownership of resources in 
short supply such as accessible metropoli-
tan housing are unlikely to be tolerated as a 
dominant basis for future wealth growth. The 
challenges of understanding house prices, 
their housing wealth consequences and wider 
economic effects are just starting. 
4. Conclusions
Taking an international perspective, we exam-
ined the social and economic implications of 
housing wealth inequalities for households. We 
focused on the potential of housing wealth to be 
mobilised to address family welfare and compen-
sate for reductions in state-welfare support, on 
the effect of intergenerational transfers on social 
mobility, and on the implications of an increasing 
concentration of housing wealth through land-
lordism. Overall, we argued that housing wealth 
inequalities, stimulated by house price growth, 
reinforce inequalities related to labour market 
and family socioeconomic positions as well as 
inequalities of gender, generations and spatial 
divisions. COVID 19 has made these inequalities 
even more visible, but they are far from new 
(The RHJ Editorial Collective 2020).
We have qualified these statements within 
the institutional context of welfare/housing 
regimes. For instance, it was shown that 
homeowners are twice advantaged (as are 
tenants twice disadvantaged) as they accu-
mulate independently housing wealth and 
financial wealth, but particularly so in the 
liberal countries where rents are deregulated 
and higher than mortgage payments; capi-
tal gains are substantial; and renting during 
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retirement causes old-age poverty. While hous-
ing wealth may offer some short-term relief 
and the potential to address sudden misfor-
tune, it does so particularly for middle-income 
households as higher-income households have 
better options (e.g. savings, insurances) while 
marginal homeowners are already mortgage-
stressed and unable to withdraw equity.
The liberal regimes of Anglo-Saxon countries 
dominate much of the existing English-
language scholarship, obscuring the potential 
to learn of and from other countries’ expe-
riences. For instance, the post-communist 
countries are least present in this literature. 
Their approach to housing as home rather than 
an asset is particularly, albeit only theoretically 
(given its historic base), relevant to the rest of 
the world now when the COVID 19 pandemic 
has brought into focus the use value of housing 
(Byrne 2020) and the lived consequences of 
a toxic race for the accumulation of housing 
wealth, e.g. PRS tenure insecurity; mortgage 
indebtedness; lack of affordable housing (par-
ticularly in the liberal countries). 
The UK-Germany contrast was particularly 
informative; it showed that the UK failure to 
manage homeownership growth and the expan-
sion of landlordism without an effective strategy 
to mitigate house price and rent increases has 
shaped an economy where returns and wealth 
have increasingly been driven by ‘rentier’ capital 
(Maclennan and Miao 2017). Better managed 
housing markets have allowed Germany to focus 
more effectively on the education, investment 
and innovation infrastructures that promote a 
successful productive economy. Comparisons 
between the Neoliberal and Social-Democrat/
Corporatist regimes seem most relevant from an 
Anglo-Saxon perspective but much can be learnt 
from the rest of the world; for that, more cross-
country comparative scholarship is needed.
Focusing on the Liberal countries, a number of 
general points about housing wealth redistri-
bution are apparent. Rising real rents across 
deregulated rental housing markets meant 
significant transfers of income, and potentially 
wealth accumulation, from tenants to landlords. 
Given the metropolitan dimensions of the pro-
cesses driving these changes, it is the owners 
of property, owned or rented, who are capturing 
the housing gains from metropolitan economic 
growth. This shift is generally regressive, 
with transfers to better off rather than poorer 
households, and has undermined the traditional 
capacity of homeownership to reduce wealth 
inequalities, while also denying lower-income 
private renters the right to a decent home (Soaita 
et al. 2020). Housing wealth accumulation and 
its distribution is at the centre of the processes 
that drive the economy towards rentier outcomes 
that reinforce inequalities (Maclennan and Miao 
2017; Piketty 2014).
More briefly, we also drew attention to emerging 
macroeconomic concerns about rising house 
prices and growing housing wealth inequalities 
as they affect the productivity and stability of 
economies and reinforce pro-cyclical spending, 
further deepening recessions. Taken together, we 
believe that, as economies now face major chal-
lenges of recovery and reconstruction, wealth 
growth based upon speculation and ownership 
of resources in short supply (e.g. accessible 
metropolitan housing), should not be tolerated 
as a dominant basis for future wealth growth. 
It is timely that the inefficient and indeed unfair 
effects that unequal housing wealth distribu-
tion has on households, local and national 
economies be addressed and contribute to 
post-COVID 19 recovery. 
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